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All right.

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Welcome to the last video in this section.

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And the real report.

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So this is a real report.

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And I have obfuscated any client information out of this so you won't be able to see who the client

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was.

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But I think it's a good indication on how I write my reports and just allow you to see what a real report

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actually looks like compared to what I kind of showed you as a baseline.

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So this should all look a little bit familiar will cover if some steps a little bit quicker than the

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arrest.

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Again table of contents you could see it's more filled out because we have a lot more going on and confidentiality

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statements the same as before.

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We're gonna go ahead just skip over that skip over this.

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We did an external penetration test here.

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We did an internal penetration test and we did a web application penetration test.

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So remember when I told you last time that we would cover the different assessment components how we

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were doing them we listed external internal and web application in a brief overview of what those are.

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Now we also have the finding severity ratings just like before we have the different risk factors talking

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about how risk is measured.

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So I added this in risk as measured by likelihood and impact.

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Here's what likelihood is here's what impact is and then here's the scope.

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So we had external scope internal scope and the web application scope.

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We did not perform any denial of service or phishing and social engineering.

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All the attacks not specified above or permitted.

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And then they did provide us an allowance of internal network access for our laptop.

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So coming through here.

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Here is the executive summary right.

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So this as we evaluated the external internal web application and this is a high level overview for

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strengths and weaknesses.

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So I'm not going to read this to you if you want to read through it.

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It really just talks about here's what we did on the external OK.

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It did not lead to any access.

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We were able to identify some things like an account enumeration right.

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And we noted that the external network was actually well patched.

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There was a strong password policy and multi factor authentication was in place on log in.

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So that kudos.

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Right.

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You want to give them kudos where you can.

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Same thing with the internal what we talked about.

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And then the web application.

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And what we found there.

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So this is a high level overview.

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Somebody can come read this executive summary and know exactly what's going on and what happened in

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their network.

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Now here are the strengths and weaknesses.

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So they were able to detect alerts on vulnerability scans.

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They were able to they had multi factor authentication in their network and they had a strong password

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policy.

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This client was actually really really sound overall.

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Their web application had section section fixation and potential denial of service.

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OK.

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And we'll talk about that in a second.

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So I like to give a nice vulnerability Summary Report Card.

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This is great for that executive level who just wants to take a look and you can see right away.

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OK.

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No critical findings no high a few moderates Lowe's informational here's what the moderates Lowe's and

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informational were.

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Here's what the recommendation was.

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Here is your final grade right.

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This is clear cut.

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And this is what you want when you're reporting you want clear cut.

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You want the executive to look at this.

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Have a nice visual aspect to it.

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So this makes a lot of sense right.

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Same thing with the web application.

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OK.

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There was a couple of high findings the rest were low and final web upgrade was B plus.

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So again very very good here.

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So coming through.

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Let's just talk about some of the findings and how it looks and my reporting.

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So identified in their network that they were vulnerable to M.S. 17 0 1 0.

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However there was a special situation here where the client was actually requiring or it was requiring

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a authenticated log in which I never got.

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So unless you had a valid log in you could not exploit this specific machine that was because there

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was no named pipes which is how the Eternal Blue actually functions.

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So to get that name Piper you had to have a log in.

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Now I give the description here the risk and the system it came on what tools I use and what references

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again and then I provide evidence.

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Here it shows that it is not past it was Windows 8 machine.

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And I say figure one not patched.

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Here's the remediation.

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Apply the patching.

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Here's a specific link that they can find on which you know which update.

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We'll do that for them.

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So you give the full overview you have to give a description.

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You talk about the risk OK.

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The likelihood moderate and the impact is high because we will get system level access if we do get

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into this machine so scrolling through you've seen this before L and ah I was able to capture the hashes

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was not able to crack the hashes.

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OK.

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Because because of that this is just a moderate but still recommendations are to disable the multicast

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name resolution B of the GPO.

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Right.

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So just like we talked about earlier this is something that's familiar to you.

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And then we use responder to capture this kind of gives that technical level of you know here's how

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we ran this type deal.

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And you could have proof of concept here with your pictures.

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So insufficient hardening S&amp;P signing disabled I'm not going to walk through every single one of these

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you know line by line.

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But S&amp;P signing disabled something you've seen before and just best practice right you want them to

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have that enabled.

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So we don't have the S&amp;P relay attacks here they had S&amp;P community string it was just a public string

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on S&amp;P we were able to enumerate that we're able to see a little bit of information on that.

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You should basically have these off disable S&amp;P if it's not required type deal.

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So just the best practice they also had a TFT server which was susceptible to a relatively new exploit

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the exploit was actually so new that there was not a proof of concept out there it was a Microsoft bulletin

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that was out.

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So because of that I put it as low finding.

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Had it been one that had a proof of concept and I was able to attempt it or exploit it like the MF 17

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010 then that becomes more of a moderate to high finding depending on if exploit happened or even a

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critical.

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There was machine access gain.

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And then lastly or close to lastly there was I am app running that was on a a non encrypted port so

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it is running on one forty three and you could get their webmaster email address and their password

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in clear attack.

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So I did that was able to log in their email as that password and that password worked across the network.

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Lastly I like to talk about the undetected malicious activity.

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So I go through and I say hey look I was attempting all these different things.

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You know you didn't see me doing and map you didn't see me doing any kind of poisoning attacks or brute

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force attacks or anything along those lines so you really need to work on fine tuning this and then

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coming in here.

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Also I like to give out historical accounts compromises so they were a relatively small company.

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Only one user showed up and this is actually from we leak info and I know I just like to point out you

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know this is informational to them.

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I'll provide them an Excel doc of all the users if a if they like that and you know just have it in

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there.

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And again the same remediation as last video you know train users not to use their email address unless

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they have to utilize strong passwords password rotation etc. onto the web application so here I said

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way early in the course I would show you an example of session fixation.

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So here is a finding on sessions fixation where you know we had this cookie.

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The cookie was set prior to authentication and then guess what it was set after authentication and then

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it was remaining the same after a logout.

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And so we had the recommendations here on what they should do for session fixation.

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We also have the references to that 4 0 loss we talk about the likelihood the impact etc..

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So that's one example on the web app side.

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Another one that they showed up for high was denial service.

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So they had this you know forgot password feature where we went in and we said Hey like you know here's

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our user name.

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And it said that user name doesn't exist.

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OK.

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Well that's that's user enumeration right.

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Well that's a low finding.

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Not really that big of a deal.

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Well when you combine that low finding with a account lockout feature where you cannot reset that password

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yourself or there is no time to log out then that becomes denial of service because guess what.

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We can enumerate every single user and we can lock out every single user.

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We can deny service to the entire application and that's how that becomes a finding as well.

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So scrolling through insufficient encryption we talked about this.

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Right.

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Remember we scan Tesla and it came back as all A's.

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Well not always as a come back as all A's.

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Here's an example we like to report on that just let them know hey you should stop using these deprecated

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ciphers you should know disable any depreciated DNS encryption ciphers scrolling through again information

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disclosure in headers.

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We've talked about this as well.

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Right.

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So the server here was disclosing that I was I asked ten point zero.

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It was disclosing ISP net and powered by ISP the net which is just telling us this is running on Microsoft.

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So we want to get rid of all this if we can.

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That way we don't know as an attacker.

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You know what we're up against.

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They were also doing a little bit of information disclosure through verbose error messages.

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If you've ever seen.

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I asked for four.

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This is a very generic four four four I guess.

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So we ding them there as well.

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Lastly I think that we have here a autocomplete and this is a slow finding but you know this could get

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a password stored on a user's browser.

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And if we were able to hijack that browser we could log in as that user.

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So we always recommend that autocomplete is disabled and then we've got actually these insecure response

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headers.

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So this is that security headers that I Io or security headers dot com that you can run but I always

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like to look at them see what they're running and then I'll say hey like you're missing content security

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policy strict transport security X cross-eyed scripting protection etc..

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So this will come up when you're doing brb sweep.

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But again you can run it on security headers dot com security headers the IO and that'll work as well

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and I have that as a reference here to kind of tell you what you have what you should have as best practice.

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And then again that undetected malicious activity so that they are aware of what we ran on the attacks

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and you know that they weren't able to detect those attacks.

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And then last page here additional scan reports and details I provided the external summary in an Excel

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format a full PDA F and an executive o PD F and these are just NASA's polls.

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All right here and then this here is from Barb sweet.

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Burps she is able to run reports as well as I listed them and I'm authenticated report and authenticated

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report.

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So they have all this available to review so.

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Lastly last page here.

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So I went through that kind of quick.

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I just wanted a overview I wanted you to see a report.

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I wanted you to put things together right.

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Like everything that you saw in that report was everything that we've covered in this class.

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There wasn't one thing really out of place and that just hopefully will give you an idea of what report

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looks like.

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Give you a little bit of confidence that like yeah.

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You know like these are things that he's talked about and now I know that they are findings and how

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to kind of present those findings and if at any point you felt like it went too fast this video just

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hit the pause button read through what was on that page and if you want to take it slower read through

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it have fun with it.

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That is that's it for this.

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So we're we're in the homestretch just a couple of more videos left.

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So now we're going to talk about career advice in the next section.

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And then we're we're out of here man.

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So let's do this.

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Let's go ahead and cut over to the next section.

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I will see over there.
